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Enhancing Deep Neural Networks Against
Adversarial Malware Examples
Deqiang Li, Qianmu Li, Yanfang Ye, and Shouhuai Xu
Abstract—Machine learning based malware detection is known to be vulnerable to adversarial evasion attacks. The state-of-the-art is
that there are no effective countermeasures against these attacks. Inspired by the AICS’2019 Challenge organized by the MIT Lincoln
Lab, we systematize a number of principles for enhancing the robustness of neural networks against adversarial malware evasion
attacks. Some of these principles have been scattered in the literature, but others are proposed in this paper for the first time. Under
the guidance of these principles, we propose a framework for defending against adversarial malware evasion attacks. We validated the
framework using the Drebin dataset of Android malware. We applied the defense framework to the AICS’2019 Challenge and won,
without knowing how the organizers generated the adversarial examples. However, we see a ∼22% difference between the accuracy in
the experiment with the Drebin dataset (for binary classification) and the accuracy in the experiment with respect to the AICS’2019
Challenge (for multiclass classification). We attribute this gap to a fundamental barrier that without knowing the attacker’s manipulation
set, the defender cannot do effective Adversarial Training.
Index Terms—Adversarial Machine Learning, Deep Neural Networks, Malware Classification, Adversarial Malware Detection.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MALWARE remains a big threat to cyber security de-spite communities’ tremendous countermeasure ef-
forts. For example, Symantec [2] reports seeing 355,419,881
new malware variants in year 2015, 357,019,453 in year
2016, and 669,974,865 in year 2017. Worse yet, there is
an increasing number of malware variants that attempted
to undermine anti-virus tools and indeed evaded many
malware detection systems [3].
In order to cope with the increasingly severe situation,
we have to resort to machine learning techniques for au-
tomating the detection of malware in the wild [4]. How-
ever, machine learning based techniques are vulnerable to
adversarial evasion attacks, by which an adaptive attacker
perturbs or manipulates malware examples into adversarial
examples that would be detected as benign rather than
malicious (see, for example, [5], [6], [7], [8]). The state-of-
the-art is that there are many attacks, but the problem of
effective defense is largely open. This is indeed the context
in which the AICS’2019 Malware Classification Challenge
is proposed. In a broader context, adversarial malware ex-
amples are a particular kind of attacks against adversarial
machine learning. Although adversarial machine learning
has received much attention in application domains such as
image processing (see, e.g., [9], [10], [11]), the problem of
adversarial malware examples are much less investigated
[6], [12].
The AICS’2019 Challenge mentioned above is essentially
about whether we can defend adversarial examples that
A preliminary version of the paper was presented at AICS’2019, which does
not published formal proceedings [1].
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wages evasion attacks in the dark, meaning:
• We (i.e., any team participating in the Challenge as
the defender) are given a training set in the form of
anonymized feature representation by the Challenge
organizer (i.e., we do not even know what the feature
names are), as well as the corresponding ground-
truth labels. We are informed by the Challenge or-
ganizer that the training data contains no adversarial
malware examples.
• We are given a test set (again, in anonymized feature
representation) and are told that the test set con-
tains both adversarial malware examples and non-
adversarial examples. We do not know what attacks
are used by the Challenge organizers to generate
those adversarial examples. We do not know which
examples in the test set are adversarial examples.
This means that we neither know which are ad-
versarial examples, nor the attacks that are used to
generate them, nor the manipulation set.
• Our task is to classify the test set into the correct
types of malware examples, including both adver-
sarial examples and non-adversarial examples.
The setting of the Challenge is realistic because in the real
world defenders are often in the dark because they do not
know what methods are used by the attackers to gener-
ate adversarial examples, which are adversarial malware
examples, what are the attackers’ manipulation sets. The
importance of the problem in defending against adversarial
malware examples and the realistic scenario of the Chal-
lenge motivated the present study.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we make the following contributions. First,
we propose, to the best of our knowledge, the first sys-
tematic framework that aims to enhance the robustness
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of malware classifiers against adversarial evasion attacks.
The framework is designed under the guidance of a set
of principles, some of which are known but scattered in
the literature (e.g., using an ensemble of classifiers), but
others are explicitly proposed for the first time, such as the
following. We propose using the capability of the optimal
white-box attack to bound the capability of any `p (p ≥ 1)
norm based gray-box attack from above, and propose using
semantics-preserving representation learning for malware
classification and detection.
Second, we empirically validated the effectiveness of the
framework against 11 grey-box attacks and 10 white-box
attacks (i.e., 21 attacks in total). The 11 grey-box attacks
include the Random attack, the Mimicry attack [13], the Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) attack [10], the Grosse attack
[12], the Bit Gradient Ascent (BGA) attack [6], the Bit Gradi-
ent Ascent (BCA) attack [6], four variants of the Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [14], and the Elastic-net
Attacks against DNNs (EAD) attack [15]. The 10 white-box
attacks leverage the victim models directly and the attack
algorithms are the same as the latter 10 ones mentioned
above. Among these attacks, the four variants of the PGD
attack and the EAD attack (i.e., five in total) are used to be
investigated in other application settings and are adapted
to the adversarial malware detection domain for the first
time in the present paper. In these experiments, adversarial
malware examples are generated by manipulating regular
malware examples while preserving their malicious func-
tionalities. Our findings include:
• Two defenses, namely adversarial regularization and
Denoising Auto-Encoder (DAE), can be used even
if there are no adversarial malware evasion attacks.
This is important because in practice the defender
might not know whether the attacker will be waging
adversarial malware evasion attacks or not, meaning
that defense against adversarial examples should
have no side-effect. That is, the defender can always
use these two defenses without worrying about any
significant side-effects.
• The popular defense of Adversarial Training is effec-
tive against grey-box adversarial malware evasion at-
tacks, but not effective against white-box adversarial
malware evasion attacks. This is because a white-box
attacker knows how the defender trained its defense
model and can generate adversarial examples that
are far from the ones in the defender’s training set.
This suggests that it is much harder to defend against
white-box attacks.
Third, we apply the framework to the AICS’2019 adver-
sarial malware classification challenge organized by the MIT
Lincoln Lab. According to the Challenge organizers, there
were “over 300 participants attempted to download and
classify the malware data set” [16] and we won the Chal-
lenge by achieving a 73.60% Harmonic mean score (which is
the metric the organizer chose to use before making the data
available); i.e., we achieve the highest score (i.e., classification
accuracy) among all of the participating teams.
Fourth, after announcing we won the Challenge, the or-
ganizer made the test data with ground-truth labels publicly
available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼arunesh/
AICS2019/challenge.html. In order to understand why we
only achieved a 73.60% Harmonic mean score, we leveraged
the test data ground-truth labels to conduct a further study.
Using a retrospective analysis of the AICS’2019 Challenge,
we find that Adversarial Training based models (leveraging
adversarial examples generated by ourselves) tend to over-
fit the perturbations in the training set, this may be caused
by the imbalance in the training set (because we do not
observe this phenomenon in the experiment based on the
balanced Drebin dataset) and/or caused by the fact that the
training set is small.
Fifth, we observe that the framework is highly effective
against adversarial malware evasion attacks on the Drebin
dataset (which gives binary ground-truth labels), but only
achieves a 73.60% in the Harmonic Mean score against the
AICS’2019 Challenge (with or without knowing the ground
truth of the test set). From this large discrepancy we draw
the following insights. (i) Without knowing any informa-
tion about the attack (which is the case of the AICS’2019
Challenge), adversarial training and other existing defenses
(including our framework) have limited capability against
adversarial evasion attacks. This is “information” barrier
(i.e., knowing nothing about the attack) may be the norm in
cyber defense against adversarial malware evasion attacks,
highlighting the importance of making effort to collect infor-
mation about the attacker and attacks. That is, “knowing the
enemy” is important, as can be shown using the following
extreme scenario: If the defender knows how the attacker
manipulates non-adversarial examples to generate adver-
sarial examples, then the defender can simply “undo” the
manipulation, which degenerates the problem to malware
detection in the absence of adversarial examples, leading
to much higher detection accuracy. It is worth mentioning
that “knowing the enemy” is indeed the first principle we
propose when we took the Challenge and before we draw the
insight mentioned above, as shown in the previous version
of the present paper [1]. (ii) The “noise” in the adversarial
examples that are incorporated into the training set may
mislead the defender’s learning/optimization algorithms,
causing ineffective classifiers.
Last but not the least, we made our the code of our mod-
els publicly available at https://github.com/deqangss/
aics2019 challenge adv mal defense.
1.2 Related Work
Since the present paper focuses on defense against adver-
sarial malware classification, we review existing studies in
this topic by emphasizing two complementary approaches:
input prepossessing and adversarial training.
Input Prepossessing. Input prepossessing transforms the
input to a different representation with the aim to re-
duce the degree of perturbation to the original input. For
example, Random Feature Nullification (RFN) randomly
nullifies features in the training and test phases [17]; hash
transformation leverages a locality-preservation property to
reduce the degree of perturbation to the original input [18];
DroidEye [19] quantizes binary feature representation via
count featurization.
Our framework uses binarization to reduce the degree
of perturbation, which is inspired by the idea of feature
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squeezing in the context of image processing [20]. This
effectively reduces the perturbation space because there are
now only two kinds of perturbations: flipping from ‘1’ to
‘0’ or flipping ‘0’ to ‘1’. This means that we effectively
consider the number of perturbations but not the ‘scale’ of
perturbation (i.e., reducing the sensitivity of classifiers to
small degrees of perturbation).
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training augments the
training data with adversarial examples to improve the
robustness of classifiers. This idea has been independently
proposed in different application settings, including [10],
[21] and [22], [23]. In particular, it has been proposed to
consider adversarial training with the optimal attack, which
in a sense corresponds to the worst-case scenario and there-
fore could lead to classifiers that are robust against the non-
optimal attacks [6]. The challenge is of course to find the
optimal attack. In our framework, we use this approach to
regularize our model and seek the optimal attack via the
gradient descent method.
1.3 Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the adversarial evasion attacks, including five at-
tacks that are adapted to the adversarial malware detection
domain for the first time. Section 3 describes our defense
framework. Section 4 validates our defense framework with
a real-world dataset. Section 5 presents the results when
applying the framework to the AICS’2019 Challenge without
knowing anything about the attack. Section 6 presents our
further study after winning the AICS’2019 Challenge and
being given the ground-truth labels of the test data of the
Challenge.
2 ADVERSARIAL MALWARE EVASION ATTACKS
2.1 Basic Idea
Consider a non-adversarial malware example z ∈ Z , where
Z is the set of all possible malware examples or example
space. Consider feature representation of z, denoted by x ∈
X , where X is the feature space. The feature representation
x can be obtained via some feature extraction methods. A
classifier f : X → Y takes x as input and outputs its label
y ∈ Y , where Y is the label space.
Consider the feature space X , the adversarial evasion at-
tack attempts to manipulate or perturb x into an adversarial
version, denoted by x′ such that
f(x′) 6= f(x), (1)
s.t. x′ ∈M(x,Sx) (2)
||x′ − x|| ≤  (3)
whereM(x,Sx) is the set of representation vectors derived
from the non-adversarial feature representation x and a
manipulation set Sx (i.e. the set of manipulations that can pre-
serve the malicious functionality of malware examples), || · ||
is a metric of interest (e.g., `p norm for some p ∈ {1, 2,∞}),
and  is the upper bound on the perturbation operation. Let
M = {M(x,Sx)|x ∈ X}, namely the adversarial malware
example feature representation set. Note that Eq.(3) says that
perturbations may be bounded from above by a given  in
the norm. The perturbation vector is denoted by δx = x′ − x.
Since the manipulation is conducted in the feature space, the
attacker needs to map x′ back into the example space Z in
order to obtain an executable adversarial malware example
z′ ∈ Z . This is a requirement that distinguishes adversarial
malware detection from adversarial machine learning in
other application domains.
In the present paper, we focus on the classifier f that
is learned as a neural network model, F : X → Ro,
which outputs (softmax) the probability mass function over
o classes (e.g., o = 2 means the classifier’s output means
whether a file z is benign or malicious). Let L : R|o| × Y 7→ R
be an appropriate loss function (e.g., cross-entropy). Since it
is difficult to formulate the constraint in Eq.(1), researchers
have proposed considering relaxation in two scenarios:
• In the case of non-targeted attacks, the objective is to
maximize the cost of classifying the x′ as y, namely
max
x′∈M
L(F(x′), y). (4)
• In the case of targeted attacks, the objective is to
minimize L(F(x′), yt) subject to x′ ∈M, namely
min
x′∈M
L(F(x′), yt), (5)
where yt (yt 6= y) is a target label of x′.
2.2 Threat Model
The threat model against malware classifiers and detectors
can be specified by what the attacker knows, what the attacker
can do, and how the attacker wages the attack.
2.2.1 What the attacker knows
There are three kinds of models from this perspective. A
black-box attacker knows nothing about classifier f except
what is implied by f ’s responses to the attacker’s queries.
A white-box attacker knows all kinds of information about
f , including its learning algorithms, model parameters, de-
fenses strategies, etc. A grey-box attacker knows an amount
of information about f that resides in between the preceding
two extremes. For example, the attacker may know the
training set or feature definitions.
2.2.2 What the attacker can do
In evasion attacks, the attacker only can manipulate the test
data, and more specifically malware examples, while obey-
ing some constraints. One constrain is to preserve the ma-
licious functionality of malware. Although the attacker can
manipulate a malware example by inserting and deleting
operators [24], [25], a simplifying assumption is to consider
insertion only (e.g., flipping a feature value from ‘0’ to ‘1’
[5], [6], [12], [17], [26], [27], [28]. The other constraint is to
maintain the relation between features. Using the ACIS’2019
malware classification challenge as an example, we note that
n-gram (uni-gram, bi-gram, and tri-gram) features reflect
sequences of Windows system API calls. This means that
when the attacker inserts an API call into a malware exam-
ple, several features related to this API call will need to be
changed according to the definition of n-gram features.
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2.2.3 How the attacker wages the attack
Researchers generate adversarial malware examples using
various machine learning techniques such as genetic algo-
rithms, reinforcement learning, generative networks, feed-
forward neural networks, decision trees, and Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [5], [22], [25], [26], [29], [30], [31]. In order
to generate adversarial malware examples effectively and
efficiently, attacks often leverage the gradients with respect
to inputs of neural network [10], [32]. We consider a broad
range of attack algorithms, some of which were introduced
in the context of malware detection but the others were
introduced in the context of image classification and then
adapted to the context of malware detection.
Random Attack. We introduce this attack as a baseline
attack in the adversarial malware detection domain. In this
attack, the attacker randomly modifies a feature at each it-
eration until a predefined number steps or no more features
to manipulate any more (if applicable). Note that the attack
is algorithm-agnostic.
Mimicry Attack. This attack was introduced in [5], [13],
[26], [33] for studying adversarial malware detection. In
this attack, the attacker perturbs or manipulates a malware
example such that the resulting adversarial version mimics
a chosen benign example as much as possible. In order to
reduce the degree of perturbations, the attacker may select
the benign example to be close to the malware example
that is to be manipulated to become an adversarial malware
example.
FGSM Attack. This attack was introduced in the context
of image classification [10] and then adapted to adversarial
malware detection [6], [19]. FGSM perturbs a feature vector
x in the direction of the `∞ norm of the gradients of the loss
function with respect to the input, namely:
x′ = ProjM (x+ ε · sign(OxL(F(x), y))) ,
where ε > 0 is a scalar known as step size, Ox indicates the
derivative of the loss function L(F(x), y) with respect to x,
and sign(·) is the element-wise sign function that returns 0
when the input is x = 0 and returns 1 (−1) when the input
x > 0 (x < 0), and ProjM(·) projects an input intoM.
Grosse Attack. This attack was introduced by Grosse et
al. [12] in the context of malware detection. The attack
considers sensitive features, namely the features have large
positive gradients as far as the softmax output is concerned.
The attack is to manipulate the absence of a feature (e.g., not
making a certain API call) into the presence of the feature
(i.e., making the API call), while preserving their malicious
functionalities. These sensitive features can be identified by
leveraging the gradients of the softmax output of a malware
example with respect to the input.
BGA Attack and BCA Attack. In the context of malware
detection, Al-Dujaili et al. [6] proposed two separate meth-
ods, dubbed BGA and BCA, for solving Eq. (4) when
manipulating malware examples in binary encoded feature
representation. Both attack methods iterate multiple steps.
In each iteration, BGA increases the feature value from ‘0’
to ‘1’ if corresponding partial derivative of the loss function
with respect to the input is greater than or equal to the gra-
dient’s `2 norm divided by 1/
√
dim, where dim is the input
dimension. In contrast, BCA flips ‘0’ to ‘1’ for a component
at the iteration corresponding to the maximum gradient
of the loss function with respect to the input. In order to
preserve malware examples’ malicious functionalities, both
attack methods insert API calls into malware examples in
the manipulation process.
PGD Attack. PGD [14] was introduced as a method for
solving Eq. (4) in the context of image classification. This
method is an iterative procedure to find perturbations via
δi+1x = Proj
(
δix + α · OδxL(F(x+ δix), y)
)
, (6)
where α > 0 is the step size, Oδx indicates the derivative
of the loss function L(F(x + δix), y) with respect to δx, and
Proj projects perturbations into a feasible domain (e.g., `∞
norm ball). In practice, the gradients may be very small,
causing a performance concern. This motivated researchers
to “normalize” the gradients in a direction of interest, such
as the `∞ norm, `2 norm, or `1 norm [21]. For each norm,
the steepest direction is leveraged to calculate perturbations
[34]. For example, the `∞ norm case is a fine-grained FGSM
attack that performs FGSM in multiple steps with step size
α (α < ε) in the context of FGSM. For a sparse attack
(in the `1 norm), the steepest direction corresponds to the
coordinate with the maximum absolute gradient value.
We propose adapting all of the three kinds of attacks,
namely PGD constrained by a norm ball of `1, `2 or `∞, into
the context of adversarial malware detection, these three
variant attacks are respectively dubbed PGD-`1, PGD-`2 and
PGD-`∞. In reality, the attacker does not have to project
perturbations into the `p norm ball, which suggests us to use
Adam [35] to solve Eq. (4) when waging an attack, leading
to a new variant of the attack, dubbed PGD-Adam. We
further propose letting Proj(·) project perturbed examples
into the domain [0, 1]dim where dim is the input dimension,
and propose mapping perturbed examples into M via a
rounding operator after the last iteration.
EAD. This attack was introduced in the context of image
classification [15], attempting to generate an adversarial
example by making small manipulations to non-adversarial
examples. Given (x, y), instead of using Eq. (4) to guide the
attack, the attack instead uses the following loss function
that incorporates the elastic-net regularization, namely
min
δx
c · g(x+ δx, y) + β||δx||1 + ||δx||22, (7)
where c is penalty factor which is identified during the
optimization process,
g(x+ δx, y) = max{[Z(x+ δx)]y −max
j 6=y
[Z(x+ δx)]j ,−κ},
Z is the layer preceding the softmax one, and κ is a hyper-
parameter.
We propose adapting the EAD attack to the context of
adversarial malware detection, while using the `1 decision
rule [15].
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 5
3 ADVERSARIAL MALWARE DEFENSE FRAME-
WORK
Rather than purely presenting the defense framework, we
also present the principles that we used to guide our design
of the defense framework. This is important because these
principles can serve as a stating point towards building
a comprehensive set of principles that can guide effective
defense in the future.
3.1 Guiding Principles
These principles are geared towards neural network classi-
fiers, which are chosen as our focus because deep learning
techniques are increasingly employed in malware defense,
but their vulnerability to adversarial evasion attacks has yet
to be tackled [36].
3.1.1 Principle 1: Knowing the enemy
This principle says that we should strive to extract useful
information about the data as much as we can. This kind of
information will offer insights into designing countermea-
sures. For example, we can ask questions of the following
kinds:
• Is the training set imbalanced? If the training set is
not balanced, various methods need to be considered
for alleviating the imbalance issue. For example, the
widely-used oversampling is to expand the examples
of the “minority” classes via random and repetitive
sampling [37].
• Are there sufficiently many examples? This issue is
important especially when there are a large number
of features and when neural networks are consid-
ered. One widely-used method is data augmentation,
which generates new examples by making slight
modifications on original examples [38].
• Are there simple indicators of adversarial examples?
If there are simple indicators of adversarial examples,
we can possibly design tailored classifiers for them.
3.1.2 Principle 2: Bridging the gap between counter-
measures against grey-box attacks and countermeasures
against white-box attacks
In grey-box attacks, the attacker knows some information
about the feature set and therefore can train a surrogate clas-
sifier fˆ : X → Y from a training set (where the realization of
fˆ is a neural network Fˆ), leveraging the transferability from
fˆ to f to generate adversarial examples. Consider an input x
for which a grey-box attacker generates perturbations using
δˆx = arg max
||δx||≤
L(Fˆ(x+ δx), y),
the change to the loss of f incurred by δˆx is
|∆L| =
∣∣∣L(F(x+ δˆx), y)− L(F(x), y)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ δˆx
0
OL(F(x+ δ), y)dδ
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
0
OL(F(x+ tδˆx), y)>δˆxdt
∣∣∣∣
≤  sup
||δ||≤
‖OL(F(x+ δ), y)‖∗ ,
where “|| · ||∗” means the dual norm of || · || and O is
the operator for computing partial derivatives of the loss
function with respect to input of neural network F. The pre-
ceding observation indicates that corresponding to the same
(and potentially large) perturbation upper bound , the loss
incurred by grey-box attacks is upper bounded by the loss
incurred by white-box attacks. This suggests us to focus on
the robustness of classifier f against the optimal white-box
attack because it accommodates the worst-case scenario. It is
worth mentioning that our observation, which applies to an
arbitrary perturbation upper bound , enhances an earlier
insight that holds for a small perturbation upper bound 
[39].
3.1.3 Principle 3: Using ensemble of classifiers rather than
a single one (i.e., not putting all eggs in one basket)
This is suggested by the observation that no single classifier
may be effective against all kinds of evasions. Worse yet,
we may not know the kinds of evasions the attacker uses
to generate adversarial examples. Therefore, we propose
using ensemble learning to enhance the robustness of neural
networks based malware classifiers.
An ensemble can be constructed by many methods
(e.g., bagging, boosting, or stacking multiple classifiers).
The generalization error of an ensemble decreases signifi-
cantly with the ensemble size when the base classifiers are
effective and mutual independent [40]. For example, random
subspace [41] is seemingly particularly suitable for formulat-
ing malware classifier ensembles because the dimension of
malware feature vectors is often very high, which indicates
a high vulnerability of malware classifiers to adversarial
examples [13], [42].
Since the output of a neural network (with softmax) is
the probability mass function over the classes in question,
the final prediction result is produced according to these
probabilities. Formally, an ensemble fen : X → Y contains a
set of neural network classifiers {fi}li=1, namely fen = {fi :
X → Y; (1 ≤ i ≤ l)}. Given a test example x, each classifier
fi defines a conditional probability on predicting y. We treat
the base classifier equally, as suggested by the study [43],
and the voting method is
fen(x) =
1
l
l∑
i=1
fi(x). (8)
3.1.4 Principle 4: Using input transformation to reduce the
degree of perturbation caused by evasion manipulation
In the context of malware classification, input transforma-
tion techniques, such as adversarial feature selection [44]
and random feature nullification [17], can reduce the degree
of perturbation in adversarial examples so as to improve
the robustness of classifiers. In typical applications, the de-
fender does not know what kinds of evasion manipulations
are used by the attacker to generate adversarial examples,
including the number of features that are manipulated by
the attacker. Therefore, we propose considering a spectrum
of evasion manipulations, from manipulating a few features
(measured by, for example, the `1 norm) to manipulating a
large number of features (but the magnitude of these manip-
ulations may be small and therefore measured for example
by the `∞ norm). Moreover, we may give higher weights
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 6
to the transformation techniques that can simultaneously
reduce the degrees of perturbations in terms of the `∞ norm,
`0 norm, or `2 norm. This suggests us to propose using the
binarization technique [20]: When the feature value of the ith
feature, denoted by xi, is smaller than a threshold Θi, we
binarize xi to 0; otherwise, we binarize xi to 1. This input
transformation reduces the perturbation space to two kinds:
flipping ‘0’ to ‘1’ and flipping ‘1’ to ‘0’.
3.1.5 Principle 5: Using adversarial training to “inject” im-
munity into classifiers
Adversarial training (also known as proactive training [22])
incorporates some adversarial examples into the training
set. Various kinds of heuristic training strategies have been
proposed (see, e.g., [9], [10], [12], [22], [45]. However, these
strategies typically deal with some specific evasion meth-
ods and therefore are not known to effective against other
evasion methods. Inspired by robust optimization, Madry et
al. [14] proposed solving the saddle point problem so as
to improve the robustness of neural networks against a
wide range of adversarial examples. This strategy has been
adapted to the context of malware detection in [6]. The pre-
ceding discussion suggests us to train neural networks that
can accommodate the optimal attack inM(x,Sx), namely
min
θ
E(x,y)∈X×Y
[
L(F(x), y) + max
x′∈M
L(F(x′), y)
]
, (9)
where θ denotes the trainable parameters of neural network
F (as the realization of fi). Intuitively, the min-max opti-
mization penalizes perturbations in the manipulation set
because the loss incurred by the optimal attack is minimized
[6], [10], [14].
In the term of small perturbations, the min-max opti-
mization regularizes DNNs. Putting another way, if we as-
sume the perturbations are small and bounded from above
in the `p norm, the inner maximization can be approximated
using the first-order Taylor expansion at point x, namely:
max
||δx||≤
L(F(x+ δx), y) ≈ max||δx||≤ [L(F(x), y) + OL
>δx].
The preceding optimization problem can be solved to ob-
tain the optimal solution L(F(x), y) + ||OL||∗ as shown
in [46]. We observe that the regularization penalizes the
dual-norm gradients of the loss function with respect to
the input. Given the empirical finding of Drucker and Le
Cun [47] that penalizing input gradients of DNN improves
classification accuracy, the min-max optimization can be
seen as a regularization technique. This motivates us to
propose performing the min-max optimization, which does
not require the defender to know the manipulation set.
The key challenge is to search for the optimal attack
against DNNs, which use non-linear activation functions
that exhibit local minima. Exact solution can be obtained
by using, for example, the Mixed Integer Linear Program
(MILP), which however is not efficient. Nevertheless, Madry
et al. [14] empirically showed that PGD can solve the inner
maximum problem effectively. In the context of adversarial
malware example, we (i.e., the defender) should project
perturbations to accommodate the set M because an ad-
versarial example must preserve the malicious functionality
of the non-adversarial malware example in question, rather
than projecting perturbations into a norm-based  ball; this
is unlike the setting of image classification (e.g.,  = 0.3
on `∞ norm [14]). Therefore, we propose optimizing via
Adam, which is a gradient descent based method, because
it converges faster than the standard approach (see Eq. (6)).
In order to cope with the problem of local minima, we
propose running the inner maximizer several times, each
with a random initial point near the training data, and then
selecting the point that maximizes the cross-entropy loss.
In the process of solving the inner optimization, it is
infeasible to generate perturbations following the gradi-
ent descent direction because of the discrete domain M.
Therefore, we propose searching for a small neighborhood
of δ˜x to find a well-aligned vector δx to maximize δ˜>x · δx
under a norm constraint on the distance between δ˜x and δx.
However, this may lead to an exponential computational
complexity. We therefore propose treating the feature rep-
resentation values as continuous on a set (e.g., [0, 1]) and
apply Adam to the inner maximization with a projection to
“clip” a perturbed vector into [0, 1]dim. Finally, we leverage
a rounding operator to map generated adversarial malware
examples toM. It is known that this strategy works well in
many cases [5], [6], [44].
3.1.6 Principle 6: Using semantics-preserving representa-
tions
Adversarial malware examples must assure that a manip-
ulated example is preserving the malicious functionality of
the original malware example. This suggests us to strive to
learn neural network models that are sensitive to malware
semantics, but not the perturbations because the latter must
preserve the malicious functionality of the original mal-
ware. Specifically, we propose using denoising autoencoder
to learn semantics-preserving representations because they
can make neural network less sensitive to perturbations. A
denoising autoencoder ae = d ◦ e unifies two components:
an encoder e : X → H that maps an input M(x) to a latent
representation r ∈ H and a decoder d : H → X that recon-
structs x from r, where the H is the latent representation
space and M refers to some operations applied to x (e.g.,
adding Gaussian noises to x). Vincent et al. [48] showed that
the lower bound of the mutual information between x and r is
maximized when the reconstruction error is minimized. In
the case of Gaussian noise η ∼ N (0, σ2) and reconstruction
loss
Eη∼N(0,σ2) ‖ae(x+ η)− x)‖22 , (10)
Alain and Bengio [49] showed that the optimal ae∗(x) is
ae∗(x) =
Eη [p(x− η)(x− η)]
Eη [p(x− η)] , (11)
where p(·) is the probability density function. Eq.(11) says
that representations of a well-trained denoising autoencoder
are insensitive to x because of the weighted average from
the neighbourhood of x, which is reminiscent of the attention
mechanism [50].
Figure 1 depicts how the learned encoder is leveraged
for classification, where the encoder structure is the same as
described in [48]. Two examples of noise are:
• Salt-and-pepper noise η: A fraction of the elements
of original example x are randomly selected, and
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Figure 1: Illustration of neural network for classification.
Blue dashed box contains the learned encoder, which and
the output layer comprises the learned neural network
classifier. The model parameters are tuned to minimize the
supervised loss function.
then set their values as their respective minimum
or maximum (i.e., effectively flipping ‘1’ to ‘0’ or
flipping ‘0’ to ‘1’).
• Adversarial perturbation δx: A perturbation δx is
added to x such that classifier f or base classifier
fi misclassifies adversarial example x′ = x+ δx.
Note that when an input transformation technique men-
tioned above is used together with a denoising autoencoder,
the former should be applied first and the latter is applied
to the transformed input.
Given a training example x over the feature space X , the
risk of a denoising autoencoder is
min
θ˜,ξ
Ex∈X [Lae(x, ae(x+ η)) + Lae(x, ae(x′))] , (12)
where Lae : X × X 7→ R calculates the mean-square error,
the learnable parameters θ˜ and ξ respectively belongs to the
encoder and decoder.
3.2 Turning Principles into A Framework
The principles discussed above guide us to propose a frame-
work for adversarial malware classification and detection,
which is highlighted in Figure 2 and elaborated below.
Specifically, we need to examine whether or not the input
has some issues (e.g., imbalanced data) that need to be
coped with via an appropriate prepossessing (according to
Principle 1). We propose using an ensemble fen of classifiers
{fi}li=1 (according to Principle 3), which are trained from
random subspace of the original feature space. Each classi-
fier fi is hardened by three countermeasures: input transfor-
mation via binarization (according to Principle 4); adversar-
ial training models on the optimal attacks using gradient
descent technique (green arrows in Figure 2, according
to Principle 2 and Principle 5); semantics-preservation is
achieved via an encoder and a decoder (according to Princi-
ple 6). In order to attain adversarial training and at the same
time semantics-preservation, we learn classifier fi via block
coordinate descent to optimize different components of the
model.
Algorithm 1: Training classifier fi
Input: Training set (X,Y ), training epoch Nepoch,
mini-batch size N , the number of repeat times
K , and an iteration step T .
1 Cope with issues like imbalanced input;
2 Select a ratio Λ of sub-features to the feature set;
3 Transform input X to X via binarization;
4 for epoch = 1 to Nepoch do
5 Sample a mini-batch {xi, yi}Ni=1 from the (X,Y );
6 for r = 1 to K do
7 Apply slight salt-and-pepper noises to {xi}Ni=1;
8 Calculate perturbation {δrxi}Ni=1 using Adam
with T steps and rounding {xi + δrxi}Ni=1 intoM, respectively;
9 end
10 Select x′i from
{
ProjM(xi + δ
r
xi)
}K
r=1
for xi
(i = 1, · · · , N) to maximize the cross-entropy
loss;
11 Calculate the reconstruction loss via Eq.(12);
12 Backpropagate the loss and update the denoising
autoencoder parameters;
13 Calculate the adversarial training loss via Eq.(9);
14 Backpropagate the loss and update classifier
parameters;
15 end
Putting the pieces together, we obtain Algorithm 1 for
training individual classifiers. The training procedure con-
sists of the following steps. (i) Given a training set (X,Y ),
we randomly select a ratio Λ of sub-features to the feature
set, and then transform X into X via the binarization
technique discussed above. (ii) We sample a mini-batch
{xi, yi}Ni=1 from (X,Y ), and calculate the perturbations δxi
and adversarial examples x′i for xi ∈ {xi}Ni=1 according to
Lines 5-10 in Algorithm 1. (iii) We pass the {x′i}Ni=1 through
the denoising autoencoder to compute the reconstruction
loss with respect to the target {xi}Ni=1 via Eq.(12), and
update the parameters of the denoising autoencoder. (iv) We
pass both the {xi + δxi}Ni=1 and {xi}Ni=1 through the neural
networks to compute the classification error with respect to
the ground-truth label {yi}Ni=1 via Eq.(9), and update the
parameters of the classifier via backpropagation. Note that
Steps (ii)-(iv) are performed in a loop. The output of the
training algorithm is a neural network classifier.
4 VALIDATING THE FRAMEWORK VIA THE DREBIN
DATASET
We validate the effectiveness of the framework using the
Drebin dataset [51] of Android malware, while considering
11 grey-box attacks and 10 white-box attacks.
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Figure 2: Overview of the proposed malware classification framework. In the training phase, an ensemble of l neural
network classifiers are trained, with each classifier hardened by three countermeasures (i.e., input transformation,
semantics-preserving, and adversarial training on the transformed data). In the test phase, the label of an example is
determined according to the result of voting by the l classifiers.
4.1 Data Pre-Processing
Dataset. The Drebin dataset [51] contains 5,615 malicious
Android packages (APKs). The dataset also provides fea-
ture values of 123,453 benign examples, together with their
SHA256 values but not the examples themselves. We down-
loaded these benign applications corresponding to the given
SHA256 values from the APK markets (e.g., Google Play,
AppChina, etc.), and collected 54,829 APKs in total. We sent
all of these examples (i.e., malicious and benign alike) to
the VirusTotal service [52]. Surprisingly, 12,496 benign APKs
were detected as malicious (rather than benign) by at least
one scanners, and most of them were detected as Adware
or Trojan; this suggests that the original Drebin training
set has been contaminated by the poisoning attack. We thus
removed these 12,496 benign examples from the original
benign dataset, leaving 42,333 benign APKs. An example
is treated as malicious if there are at least two scanners
say it is malicious, and is treated as benign if no scanners
detect it. The resulting dataset contains 5,615 malicious
APKs and 42,333 benign APKs, and 47,948 examples in total.
We split the dataset into three disjoint sets for training (60%),
validation (20%), and test (20%), respectively.
Feature Extraction. APK is an archive file which mainly
contains AndroidManifest.xml, classes.dex, and others (e.g.,
res, assets). The manifest file describes an APK’s information,
such as the name, version, announcement, library files used
by the application. The source code is compiled to build
the .dex file which is understandable by the Dalvik Virtual
Machine (DVM).
Following prior adversarial learning studies [12], [13],
[51], we use the Drebin features, which consist of 8 subsets
of features, including 4 subsets of features extracted from
AndroidManifest.xml (denoted by S1, S2, S3, S4, respectively)
and 4 subsets of features extracted from the disassem-
bled dexcode (denoted by S5, S6, S7, S8, respectively). More
specifically, (i) S1 contains the features that are related to
the access of an APK to the hardware of a smartphone
(e.g., camera, touchscreen, or GPS module); (ii) S2 contains
the features that are related to the permissions requested
by the APK in question; (iii) S3 contains the features that
are related to the application components (e.g., activities,
service, receivers, etc.); (iv) S4 contains the features that are
related to the APK’s communications with the operating
system; (v) S5 contains the features that are related to the
critical system API calls, which cannot run without appro-
priate permissions or the root privilege; (vi) S6 contains the
features that correspond to the used permissions; (vii) S7
contains the features that are related to the API calls that can
access sensitive data or resources on a smartphone; (viii)
S8 contains the features that are related to IP addresses,
hostnames and URLs found in the disassembled code.
In order to extract features of the applications, we utilize
the Androgurad 3.3.5, which is a reverse engineering toolkit
for APK analysis [53]. Note that 141 APKs cannot be ana-
lyzed. Moreover, a feature selection is conducted to remove
those low-frequency features for the sake of computational
efficiency. As a result, we keep 10,000 features with high
frequencies. The APK is mapped on the feature space as
a binary feature vector, where ‘1’ (‘0’) corresponding to a
feature represent the presence (absence) of the feature in an
APK.
4.2 Training Classifiers
Classifiers. In order to validate the defense framework, we
use and compare five classifiers for the defender: (i) the
basic DNN with no effort made to defend against adversar-
ial examples; (ii) hardened DNN incorporating adversarial
training with known manipulation set (dubbed Adversar-
ial Training), which manifests Principle 2 (i.e., norm-based
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grey-box attacks can be bounded by the worst-case white-
box attack) and Principle 5 (i.e., min-max adversarial train-
ing); (iii) hardened DNN incorporating adversarial train-
ing for regularization (dubbed Adversarial Regularization)
because the defender may not know anything about the
manipulation set, which is true in the case of the AICS’2019
challenge; (iv) DAE-based classifier incorporating Principle
6 (i.e., semantics-preserving representations); (v) classifier
hardened by both Adversarial Training and DAE (dubbed
AT+DAE); (v) ensemble of AT+DAE classifiers in the ran-
dom subspace (manifesting Principle 3). Note that we do
not consider Principle 1 (i.e., knowing your enemy) because
we will elaborate attacks in the next subsection. Since the
feature representation is binary, we cannot consider Princi-
ple 2 (i.e., binarization) either.
Hyper-parameters Setting. We use DNNs with two fully-
connected hidden layers (each layer having neurons 160)
and the ReLU activation function. All classifiers are opti-
mized by using Adam with epochs 150, mini-batch size
128, and learning rate 0.001. For Adversarial Training, the
inner maximization is optimized by using Adam with
learning rate 0.02 and iteration steps T = 100 to search
adversarial examples as many as possible. For Adversarial
Regularization, we set the learning rate as 0.01 for Adam
and conduct preliminary experiments to tune the maximum
iteration steps T . Finally, the T is set as 60 in Adversarial
Regularization. We use an ensemble of 5 base classifiers. Our
preliminary experiments suggest us to learn base classifiers
from the entire training set and the entire feature set. Unless
with special mentioning, all classifiers that require to solve
the inner maximization are trained without random starting
points so as to ease the analysis (i.e., K = 0).
4.3 Attack Experiments and Classification Results
We consider a threat model that is specified by whether
the attacker wages grey-box or white-box attacks, and con-
straints on the attacker’s manipulation operation.
Grey-box vs. White-box Attacks. We consider two attack
scenarios. (i) Grey-box attacks: In this setting, we simulate the
attack scenario of the AICS’2019 Challenge organizers. That
is, the attacker knows the dataset, feature set, but not the
defender’s learning algorithm. The attacker generates ad-
versarial examples from a surrogate classifier. We consider a
surrogate model of two fully-connected hidden layers (200
neurons each layer) and train the model on the training
set using the Adam optimizer with batch size 128, epochs
30, learning rate 0.001. (ii) White-box attacks: In this setting,
the attacker knows everything about the malware detector.
Therefore, the adversarial examples are directly generated
from the corresponding malware detector.
Manipulations Constraints. Given an APK, we consider
both incremental and decremental manipulations. The incre-
mental manipulation allows the attacker to insert some
objects (e.g., activity) into an APK example to avoid detec-
tion. The decremental manipulation allows the attacker to
hide some objects (e.g., activity) to evade detection. In any
case, the adversarial example should preserve the malicious
functionality of the malware from which the adversarial
example is derived.
When the attacker uses incremental manipulations, the
attacker can insert some manifest features (e.g., request
extra permissions and hardware, state additional services,
Intent-filter, etc.). However, some elements are hard to insert,
such as content-provider, because the absence of URI will
corrupt an APK example. With respect to the .dex file, a
dead function or class (which is never called) containing
specified system APIs can be injected without destroying
the APK example. The similar means can be performed for
the string injection (e.g., IP address), as well.
When the attacker uses decremental manipulations, the
APK’s information in the xml files can be changed (e.g.,
package name). However, it is impossible to remove activity
entirely because an activity may represent a class imple-
mented in the .dex code. Nevertheless, we can rename an
activity and change its relevant information (e.g., activity
label), while noting that the related components in the .dex
should be modified accordingly. The other components (e.g.,
service, provider and receiver) also can be modified in the
similar fashion, and the resource files (e.g., images, icons)
can be manipulated as well. In term of dexcode, the method
names and class names that are defined by developers
could be modified, too. Note that the corresponding state-
ment, instantiation, reference, and announcements should
be changed accordingly. Moreover, user-specified strings can
be obfuscated using encryption and the cipher-text will
be decrypted at running time. Further, the attacker can
hide public and static system APIs using Java reflection and
encryption together. This is shown by the example in List 1.
All of the modifications mentioned above only obfuscate an
APK without changing its functionalities.
public void hideAPI() throws Exception{
// hide ’println’
String e_str = "ExMLXEZUDw";
// get ’println’
String p_str = decryptStr(e_str);
Class c = java.lang.System.class;
Field f = c.getField("out");
Method m = f.getType().
getMethod(p_str,String.class);
m.invoke(f.get(null), "hello world!");
return void
}
Listing 1: Java code to hide the API method “println”.
One challenge is that the attacker needs to perform fine-
grained manipulations on compiled files automatically at
scale, while preserving the functionalities of malware sam-
ples. This important because a small change in a malware
example can render the file unexectuable. Since Android
APIs have upgraded multiple times during the past 5 years,
the attacker has to inject compatible APIs into an APK exam-
ple when manipulating a malware example. The preserva-
tion of functionalities may be estimated by using a dynamic
malware analysis tool, (e.g., VirusTotal or Sandbox).
Mapping Manipulations to Feature Space. The aforemen-
tioned manipulations modify static Android features, such
as API calls, OpCode, call graphs, and so forth. We observe
that two kinds of perturbations can be applied to the Drebin
feature space as follows:
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Table 1: Overview of manipulations on feature space, where
X(7) indicates that the feature addition or removal operation
can (cannot) be performed on features in the corresponding
subset.
Feature sets Addition Removal
manifest
S1 Hardware X 7
S2 Requested permissions X 7
S3 Application components X X
S4 Intents X 7
dexcode
S5 Restricted API calls X X
S6 Used permission 7 7
S7 Suspicious API calls X X
S8 Network addresses X X
• Feature addition. The attacker can increase the fea-
ture values (e.g., flipping ‘0’ to ‘1’) of an appropriate
objects, such as components (e.g., activity), system
APIs, and IP address.
• Feature removal. The attacker can flip ‘1’ to ‘0’ by
removing or hiding objects (e.g., activity, APIs.)
Table 1 summarize our manipulations on the Drebin
feature space. We observe that neither addition nor removal
operation can be applied to S6 because this subset of fea-
tures depends on S5 and S7, meaning that modifications on
S5 or S7 will cause changes to features in S6.
Evasion Attacks Setting. We randomly select 800 malware
examples from the test set for waging evasion attacks.
For this purpose, we use the attack algorithms described
in Section 2.2. In the settings of Random, Grosse, BGA,
BCA, and `1-PGD attacks, we iterate these algorithms until
reaching a predefined maximum number of steps, while
noting that Grosse, BGA, and BGA attacks leverage feature
addition only. For waging the Mimicry attack, we use 10
benign examples to guide the perturbation of a single mal-
ware example, leading to 10 adversarial examples; then, we
select from these 10 the adversarial example that causes the
miss-classification with the smallest perturbation. For other
attacks, we round the perturbations to accommodate the dis-
crete domainM. In order to prevent the perturbations from
being suppressed by rounding, we run attack algorithms
with sufficient iterations and a proper step size as follows.
We set  = 1.0 for the FGSM attack. In `∞ norm and Adam
based PGD attacks, the step size is α = 0.01 with iterative
times 100. The `2 norm PGD attack is performed for 100
iteration steps with step size 1.0. For the EAD attack under
the grey-box attack, we set β = 0.1 and κ = 64.0 using
the `1 decision rule [15] for improving the transferability
of adversarial malware examples. In the white-box attack
setting, we tune the κ for each model. All attacks perform
these manipulations to preserve the non-adversarial mal-
ware examples’ malicious functionality.
4.4 Experimental Results
The Case of No Adversarial Attacks. Table 2 summarizes
the classification results on the test set, which are mea-
sured with the standard metrics of False Negative Rate
(FNR), False Positive Rate (FPR), and classification Accuracy
(i.e., the percentage of the test examples that are classified
correctly) [54]. We observe that when compared with the
Basic DNN, Adversarial Training achieves a lower FNR
(0.438% lower) but a higher FPR (1.457% higher). A similar
result is exhibited by DAE, AT+DAE and Random Subspace.
This can be explained as follows: by injecting adversarial
malware examples into the training set, the learning process
makes the model search for malware examples in a bigger
space, explaining the drop in FNR and increase in FPR
and therefore a slightly drop (≤ 1.74%) in the classification
accuracy. Adversarial Regularization achieves a comparable
classification accuracy as Basic DNN, but the highest FNR
among the classifiers we considered. This may be caused
by the fact that when DNN is regularized in an adversar-
ial fashion, no information about the manipulation set is
known. In summary, we draw:
Insight 1. In the absence of adversarial attacks, Adversarial
Training and DAE can detect more malware examples than the
Basic DNN (because of their smaller FNR), at the price of a small
side-effect in the FPR and therefore the classification accuracy.
Table 2: Effectiveness of the defense framework when there
are no adversarial attacks.
Defense FNR (%) FPR (%) Accuracy (%)
Basic DNN 3.684 0.320 99.28
Adversarial Training 3.246 1.777 98.05
Adversarial Regularization 4.737 0.190 99.27
DAE 3.246 0.450 99.22
AT+DAE 3.246 1.694 98.12
Random Subspace 2.456 2.464 97.54
The Case of Grey-box Attacks. Table 3 reports the clas-
sification results of the defense framework against grey-
box attacks. We make the following observations. First,
Basic DNN cannot defend against evasion attacks and is
completely ruined by attacks that include Mimicry, FGSM,
Grosse, BGA, BCA, PGD-`1, PGD-`∞ and EAD. Second,
Adversarial Training significantly enhances the robustness
of DNN, achieving a 85.63% accuracy against the Mimicry
attack and a 100% accuracy against other 6 attacks (i.e., BGA,
BCA and 4 variants of PGD). Third, Adversarial Regulariza-
tion, without seeing any adversarial examples, can defend
against FGSM, PGD-`∞, PGD-`2 and PGD-Adam attacks,
but are not effective against attacks such as EAD, Grosse,
BCA, and PGD-`1. A similar phenomenon is observed
for DAE. Nevertheless, when using Adversarial Training
and DAE together, namely AT+DAE, the defense achieves
the highest robustness against evasion attacks than using
Adversarial Training and DAE individually, except for the
Mimicry attack and the FGSM attack. Fourth, the Random
Subspace defense consists of five AT+DAE classifiers and
achieves the highest among the considered defenses against
the attacks investigated. In summary, we draw:
Insight 2. Under grey-box attacks, Adversarial Training is an
effective defense against evasion attacks; DAE offers some defense
capability that may not be offered by Adversarial Training; using
an ensemble of five AT+DAE classifiers is more effective than
using a single AT+DAE classifier against evasion attacks; without
knowing the attacker’s manipulation set, Adversarial Regulariza-
tion enhances the robustness of Basic DNN but cannot defend
attacks such as Grosse.
The Case of White-box Attacks. Table 4 reports the classi-
fication results against white-box attacks. We make the fol-
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Table 3: Effectiveness of the defense framework against grey-box adversarial malware evasion attacks.
Attack Accuracy (%)Basic DNN Adversarial Training (AT) Adversarial Regularization DAE AT+DAE Random Subspace
No Attack 96.63 97.00 95.63 96.88 96.50 97.75
Random Attack 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mimicry 10x 35.25 85.63 34.88 52.63 85.13 89.88
FGSM [10] 4.00 97.50 95.88 96.88 96.75 98.00
Grosse [12] 1.13 97.00 11.75 65.13 97.63 99.38
BGA [6] 0.25 100.0 71.13 100.0 100.0 100.0
BCA [6] 0.25 100.0 49.50 58.00 100.0 100.0
PGD-`1 0.25 100.0 43.88 53.88 100.0 100.0
PGD-`2 58.63 100.0 99.75 100.0 100.0 100.0
PGD-`∞ 0.25 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
PGD-Adam 52.50 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
EAD [15] 5.50 92.88 20.25 72.00 95.13 98.38
Table 4: Effectiveness of the defense framework against white-box adversarial malware evasion attacks.
Attack Accuracy (%)Basic DNN Adversarial Training (AT) Adversarial Regularization DAE AT+DAE Random Subspace
Mimicry 10x 11.63 68.25 14.88 40.88 69.13 79.75
FGSM [10] 0.00 97.00 95.00 96.88 96.50 97.75
Grosse [12] 0.00 60.75 16.63 35.50 81.13 91.75
BGA [6] 0.00 97.00 91.50 74.00 96.50 97.50
BCA [6] 0.00 61.13 16.63 35.38 81.50 91.75
PGD-`1 0.00 69.50 21.88 51.00 81.25 88.50
PGD-`2 3.00 93.63 82.13 89.75 91.13 91.63
PGD-`∞ 0.00 90.38 89.75 35.38 85.50 73.63
PGD-Adam 1.13 95.13 89.63 88.25 92.88 90.00
EAD [15] 0.00 88.38 24.50 2.50 82.13 60.50
lowing observations. First, all attacks can almost completely
evade Basic DNN, but the Mimicry attack is, relatively
speaking, less effective because this attack leverages less
information about the classifiers than what the other attacks
do.
Second, Adversarial Training is effective against the
FGSM attack, the BGA attack and the PGD-Adam attack, but
not effective against the Grosse attack, the BCA attack, and
the PGD-`1 attack because these attacks manipulate a few
features when generating adversarial examples and these
manipulations are unlikely perceived by Adversarial Train-
ing (owing to the fact that Adversarial Training penalizes
adversarial spaces searched by Adam). Although the EAD
attack also perturbs malware example using small pertur-
bations, some of the perturbations are suppressed by the
projection to accommodate the discrete domain, explaining
why Adversarial Training can defend against EAD at an
accuracy of 88.38%.
Third, as expected, Adversarial Regularization is less
effective than Adversarial Training. Adversarial Regular-
ization achieves a 91.50% accuracy against the white-box
BGA attack, in contrast to the 71.13% accuracy against the
grey-box BGA attack. This is counter-intuitive but can be
attributed to the fact that Adversarial Regularization can
render some gradient-based methods, such as BGA, useless,
which is a phenomenon known as gradient-masking [55], [56],
[57].
Fourth, AT+DAE achieves considerable robustness
against those attacks, with at least a 81.13% accuracy except
for the Mimicry attack, which can defeat the AT+DAE
defense because Mimicry can make adversarial malware
examples similar to benign ones [13].
Fifty, the ensemble of Random Subspace defense
achieves the highest accuracy against the Mimicry attack,
the Grosse attack and the BCA attack than the other de-
fenses, with about 10% higher accuracy when compared
with the AT+DAE defense. However, the ensemble of
Random Subspace achieves lower accuracy than AT+DAE
against the PGD-`2 attack, the PGD-`∞ attack, the PGD-
Adam attack, and the EAD attack. This may be caused
by the fact that the classifier AT+DAE cannot effectively
mitigate these attacks. In summary, we draw:
Insight 3. Adversarial Training cannot effectively defend against
white-box attacks that were not considered in the training phase;
the ensemble of Random Subspace defense is effective against
several white-box attacks but not others. That is, no defenses can
defeat all kinds of white-box attacks.
5 APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE
AICS’2019 CHALLENGE WITHOUT KNOWING
ANYTHING ABOUT THE ATTACKS
The challenge is in the context of adversarial malware clas-
sification (more precisely, multiclass classification), namely
constructing evasion-resistant, machine learning based mal-
ware classifiers. The dataset, including both the training set
and the test set, consists of feature vectors extracted from
Windows malware examples, each of which belongs to one
of the following five classes: Virus, Worm, Trojan, Packed
malware, and AdWare. For each example, the features are
collected by the challenge organizer via dynamic analysis,
including the Windows API calls and further processed
unigram, bigram, and trigram API calls. The feature names
(e.g., API calls) and the class labels are “obfuscated” by the
challenge organizer as integers, while noting the obfuscation
preserves the mapping between the features and the inte-
gers representation of them. For example, three API calls are
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represented by three unique integers, say 101, 102, and 103;
then, a trigram API call “101;102;103” means a sequence of
API calls 101, 102, and 103. In total there are 106,428 features.
The test set consists of adversarial examples and non-
adversarial examples (i.e., unperturbed malware examples).
Adversarial examples are generated by a variety of pertur-
bation methods, which are not known to the participating
teams. However, the ground-truth labels of the test exam-
ples are not given to the participating teams. This means
that the participating teams cannot calculate the accuracy of
their detectors by themselves. Instead, they need to submit
their classification results (i.e., labels on the examples in the
test set) to the challenge organizer, who will calculate the
classification score of each participating team. The Chal-
lenge organizer decided to use the Macro F1 score as the
classification accuracy metric. The Macro F1 score is the
unweighted mean of the F1 score [58] for each class of
objects in question (i.e., type of malware in this case). The
final score is the Harmonic mean upon the two Macro F1
scores, namely the one for the adversarial examples in the
test data and the other for the non-adversarial examples in
the test data. Given these two numbers, say a1 and a2, their
their harmonic mean 2a1a2a1+a2 .
5.1 Basic Analysis of the AICS’2019 Challenge
As discussed in Principle 1 of the framework, our basic anal-
ysis aims to identify some basic characteristics that should
be taken into consideration when adapting Algorithm 1 to
this specific case study.
Is the training set imbalanced? The training set consists of
12,536 instances, and the test set consists of 3,133 instances.
The training set contains 8,678 instances in class ‘0’, 1,883
instances in class ‘1’, 771 instances in class ‘2’, 692 instances
in class ‘3’, and 512 instances in class ‘4’. We can calculate
the maximum ratio between the number of instances in
different classes is 16.95, indicating that the training set is
highly imbalanced.
In order to cope with the imbalance in the training
set, we use the Oversampling method to replicate randomly
selected feature vectors from a class with a small number
of feature vectors. The replication process ends until the
number of feature vectors is comparable to that of the
largest class (i.e., the class with the largest number of feature
vectors), where “comparable” is measured by a predefined
ratio. In order to see the effect of this ratio, we use a 5-fold
cross validation on the training set to investigate the impact
of this ratio. The classifier consists of neural networks with
two fully-connected layers (each layer having 160 neurons
with the ReLU activation function), which are optimized
via Adam with epochs 50, mini-batch size 128, learning rate
0.001. The model is selected when achieving the best Macro
F1 score on the validation set.
Table 5 shows that the Macro F1 score decreases as the
oversampling ratio of minority classes increases. In order
to make each mini-batch of training data contain examples
from all classes, which would be critical in muticlass classi-
fication, our experience suggests us to select the 30% ratio.
Are there sufficiently many examples? Machine learning,
especially deep learning, models need to be trained with a
“large” number of examples, where “large” is relative to the
Table 5: Accuracy (%) and Macro F1 score (%) are reported
with a 95% confidence interval with respect to the ratio
parameter (%), where ‘—’ means learning a classifier using
the original training set.
Ratio (%) Accuracy (%) Macro F1 (%)
— 93.20±1.04 85.52±1.12
30 92.86±0.75 85.47±1.04
40 92.38±1.00 84.87±1.07
50 92.21±0.60 84.87±1.00
60 92.48±1.12 84.62±1.01
number of features. In the challenge dataset, the training set
contains 12,536 examples while noting that there are 106,428
features, which may lead to overfitting. To cope with this,
we note that adversarial training is a data augmentation
method [10], which can be leveraged to regularize the
resulting classifiers.
Are there simple indicators of adversarial examples? In
the first test set published by the challenge organizer, we
see negative values for some features. These negative values
would indicate that they are adversarial examples. In the
revised test set provided by the challenge organizer, there
are no negative feature values, meaning that there are no
simple ways to tell whether an example is adversarial or
not. In spite of this, we can speculate on the count of
perturbed features by comparing the number of nonzero
entries corresponding to feature vectors in the training set
and feature vectors in the test set.
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Figure 3: Histogram of the normalized frequency of the
number of nonzero entries of feature vectors in the training
set vs. test set. The dashed line represents the mean value.
Figure 3 shows the normalized frequency of the number
of nonzero entries of feature vectors in the training set vs.
test set. We observe that their normalized frequencies are
similar except that some test examples have more nonzero
entries (> 1200). Their mean values are much smaller than
the input dimension (106, 428), suggesting that the average
number of perturbed features may be small.
5.2 Classification Results: Challenge Winner
We train 10 neural network classifiers to formulate an
ensemble, including 4 classifiers using the input trans-
formation, adversarial training, and semantics-preservation
techniques discussed in the framework, and the other 6
classifiers using the input transformation and adversarial
training techniques because examples are perturbed with-
out preserving their malicious functionality in the training.
Since we do not have access to the malware examples, we
cannot tell whether a feature perturbation preserves the
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malware functionality or not. For adversarial training, we
have to perform its variant Adversarial Regularization. The
inner maximization performed by using gradient descent
with respect to the transformed input iterates T = 55 times
via the Adam optimizer [35] with learning rate 0.01. We
leverage the random start points and K = 5. The ratio
for random subspace method is set as Λ = 0.5. Each base
classifier has two fully-connected hidden layers (each layer
having neurons 160), uses the ELU activation function, and
is optimized by Adam with mini-batch size 128 and learning
rate 0.001. The ensemble achieves a Macro F1 score of 88.30%
upon non-attack dataset, a 63.0% Macro F1 score under
attacks, and a Harmonic mean on both Macro F1 scores of
73.60%. This is the highest Harmonic Mean score among the
participating teams. Although this score is not ideal, this
may be inherent to the fact that we as the defender do not
know any information about the attack. This leads to:
Insight 4. The information “barrier” that the defender does not
know the attacker’s manipulation set is a fundamental one because
the attacker may use adversarial malware examples that are far
away from what the defender would use to train its defense model.
This insight suggests that we may treat 70%-80% as a
reasonably high classification accuracy when nothing about
the attack is known, rather than a 90%-100% accuracy that
may be achieved in the absence of adversarial malware
evasion attacks.
6 APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO THE
AICS’2019 CHALLENGE AFTER KNOWING THE
GROUND TRUTH OF THE TEST SET
After the Challenge organizer announced that we won the
Challenge, the ground-truth labels of the test set are released
so that we can conduct further study. We stress that we still
do not know the attacks that were used by the Challenge
organizer to generate the adversarial examples.
6.1 Training Classifiers
Classifier. We consider and compare five classifiers: (i) the
Basic DNN without incorporating any defense; (ii) hard-
ened DNN incorporating the binarization technique [20]
(dubbed Binarization); (iii) hardened DNN incorporating
adversarial regularization (dubbed Adversarial Regular-
ization); (iv) hardened DNN incorporating both Binariza-
tion and Adversarial Regularization (denoted as Binariza-
tion+AR); (v) an ensemble of Binarization+AR classifiers.
Hyper-parameter Settings. All of the DNNs we use have
two fully-connected hidden layers (each layer having 160
neurons), use the ReLU activation function, and are op-
timized by Adam with epochs 30, mini-batch size 128,
and learning rate 0.001. For Adversarial Regularization, we
preform the inner maximization via Adam (with learning
rate 0.01). Our preliminary experiments suggest us to set
iterations T = 60. The starting point is chosen from K = 5
initialized points with salt-and-pepper noises, which have
a noise ratio ηr chose uniformly at random from 0 to
ηrmax = 10%. This means at most 10% of the features can
be changed by salt-and-pepper noises. For ensembles, we
train 5 Binarization+AR classifiers, each of which is learned
from a 80% data randomly selected from the training set,
with a Λ = 0.5 fraction of features. We augment the training
set for the last three classifiers as described in Section 5.1.
6.2 Classification Results
Table 6 reports the results with and without adversarial
attacks. We make the following observations. First, Adver-
sarial Regularization significantly improves the Macro F1
score against the attacks when compared with the Basic
DNN (a 23.93% higher Macro F1 score). The Macro F1 score
of Adversarial Regularization in the absence of adversarial
attacks drops slightly when compared with the Basic DNN
(≈ 1%). Second, by comparing Binarization (row 2) and
the Basic DNN, Binarization can improve the robustness
of DNN against adversarial attacks a little bit (a 0.47%
increase in the Macro F1 score). Third, the Random Sub-
space defense achieves a higher classification accuracy than
Binarization+AR, in the presence or absence of adversarial
attacks.
Hyper-parameters Sensitivity. In Adversarial Regulariza-
tion, ηrmax is crucial and is set manually. Intuitively, a greater
ηrmax lets the defense perceive a larger space, but inhibiting
the convergence of training. In addition, we want to know
whether the oversampling is useful or not for Adversarial
Regularization. We thus conduct a group of experiments
to justify these settings. Table 7 shows the experimental
results. We observe that the Macro F1 score in the presence
of adversarial evasion attacks increase with the increase of
ηrmax from 0% to 10%. Meanwhile, Accuracy and Macro
F1 score do not decrease in the absence of adversarial
evasion attacks, and actually slightly increase at ηrmax = 1%.
Furthermore, when the oversampling technique is leveraged
at ηrmax = 10% (the last row), both Accuracy and Macro
F1 score in the absence of adversarial evasion attacks de-
crease slightly (< 1%). Nevertheless, the Macro F1 score in
the presence of adversarial evasion attacks increases from
56.22% to 58.93%. This leads us to draw:
Insight 5. Oversampling is not necessary when there are no
adversarial evasion attacks, but improves the effectiveness of
Adversarial Regularization against adversarial evasion attacks.
6.3 Retrospective Analysis of the AICS’2019 Challenge
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Figure 4: Visualization of learned representations of Bina-
rization+AR with no attacks (a) and attacks (b), respectively.
We now analyze the impact of imbalanced training set.
In the Challenge, the majority and minority classes are
treated equally important because of the use of the Macro
F1 score as the classification accuracy metric. Owing to the
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Table 6: Classifiers Accuracy (%) and Macro F1 score (%) with no attacks vs. using grey-box adversarial evasion attacks
respectively, and the Harmonic mean (%) of the two Macro F1 scores.
Classifiers No attacks (%) Attacks (%) Harmonic mean (%)Accuracy Macro F1 Accuracy Macro F1
Basic DNN 96.24 88.91 63.46 35.00 50.23
Binarization 95.80 87.99 63.79 35.47 50.56
Adversarial Regularization (AR) 95.66 87.98 72.02 58.93 70.58
Binarization+AR 95.62 87.87 75.22 59.87 71.22
Random subspace 95.93 88.58 76.02 62.95 73.60
Table 7: Accuracy (%) and Macro F1 score (%) of Adversarial
Regularization in the absence of adversarial evasion attacks
vs. the presence of adversarial evasion attacks, with respect
to the maximum salt-and-pepper noise ratio ηrmax, where ∗
means that a classifier is learned using oversampling.
Noise Ratio (%) No attacks (%) Attacks (%)Accuracy Macro F1 Accuracy Macro F1
ηrmax = 0 96.11 88.43 69.68 49.87
ηrmax = 0.1 95.93 88.10 74.00 50.52
ηrmax = 1 96.24 89.14 73.11 55.98
ηrmax = 10 96.19 88.46 77.11 56.22
ηrmax = 20 96.06 88.14 75.11 51.23
ηrmax = 10
∗ 95.66 87.98 72.02 58.93
use of the cross-entropy loss function, DNN-based classifiers
treat each example independently and equally important.
Therefore, there is a gap between the training and the test
(because the training data is imbalanced). This suggests
that Adversarial Regularization may suffer from this issue
because more adversarial perturbations can be generated for
the majority classes than from the minority classes. In order
to explore this problem, we visualize the learned represen-
tations (output of the last hidden layer) of Binarization+AR.
The 160 dimensions of the representation are reduced to 2
dimensions by using t-SNE [59].
Figure 4 presents the visualization of the result. We
observe that the majority class “0” overwhelms the repre-
sentation space. More specifically, Figure 4a shows that the
classifier can separate most of data clearly when there are no
adversarial evasion attacks; Figure 4b shows that the repre-
sentation of class “0” tends to mix with the representation of
the other classes when there are adversarial evasion attacks.
This indicates that the classifier would make mistakes when
dealing with the intersection regions. This leads to:
Insight 6. Data imbalance makes it harder to defend against
adversarial evasion attacks.
On the other hand, Adversarial Regularization over-
fits the perturbations searched by the inner maximizer
unexpectedly. Figure 5 demonstrates this phenomenon. we
observe that, instead of dropping consistently, the cross-
entropy loss induced by the adversarial evasion attacks
increases significantly after about 10 epochs. Meanwhile,
the cross-entropy loss on the test set with no adversarial
evasion attacks changes slightly, until the number of epochs
approaches 100. This means that the DNN will memorize
the perturbations. Therefore, new defense techniques are
needed in order to achieve a much higher accuracy against
the Challenge instances. This suggests:
Insight 7. Without knowing the manipulation set, unsuper-
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Figure 5: Cross entropy loss of the classifier hardened by
Adversarial Regularization over the training set, the test set
with no adversarial evasion attacks, and the test set with
adversarial evasion attacks, with respect to the number of
epochs.
vised learning may play an important role because unsupervised
defenses are devised without using label information about the
perturbed examples.
7 CONCLUSION
We have systematized six principles for enhancing the ro-
bustness of neural network classifiers against adversarial
evasion attacks in the setting of malware classification.
These principles guided us to design a framework, which
leads to a concrete training algorithm. We validated our
framework using a real-world dataset and applied it to the
AICS’2019 Challenge. We drew a number of insights that
are useful for real-world defenders. We hope this paper
will inspire more research into this important problem.
Future research problems are abundant, such as: extending
and refining the principles against evasion attacks, seeking
principles to enhance robustness of adversarial malware
detection against poisoning attacks, designing more robust
techniques against adversarial malware examples.
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